R v Dhami, 2019 ONCJ 10
The Issue
How does the Mentuck/Dagenais test intersect with section 486.5 regarding the issuance of a publication ban?
The Answer
The Mentuck/Dagenais test requires consideration of the following two factors regarding the issuance of a publication ban:
(i) The order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and,
(ii) The court considers whether the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial and the efficacy of the administration of justice.
In 2015 Parliament amended section 486.5, removing the requirement that such an order be “necessary for the proper administration of justice” and replacing it with the requirement that the order be “in the interest of the proper administration of justice”. The determination of whether the order is in the interest of justice is governed by, inter alia, a consideration of the factors set out in section 486.5(7).
The consideration of a publication ban request is governed by this statutory test.
The Fine Print
Two comments of the court that are helpful in today’s modern age of “media” and the modern recognition of victim vulnerability and rights are worth noting. First, on the need to recognize victims and the impact on them:
As a society, we recognize the vulnerability of persons with a disability and the need to remove barriers that impede them from leading productive, meaningful lives and discourage them from engaging in the court system. These values are not insignificant. Nor is the risk for harm to be downplayed. The importance of protecting vulnerable members of society, their right to privacy, encouraging witness participation and promoting a sense of fairness within the criminal justice system is of considerable importance in our society. Multiple provisions in the Criminal Code endeavour to minimize harm and protect the privacy of victims and witnesses. See for example ss. 486.4, 486.1, 486.2, s. 278, s. 276. [Para 30].
Second, a comment on the modern day media:
It is worth noting that media and internet attention today does not exact the same toll on an individual's privacy that it did 25 years ago.
Today, searching through traditionally printed newspaper articles for information is not possible without a great deal of effort and time. By contrast, information about an individual is immediately available with only a few strokes on a key board on a smartphone held in the palm of anyone’s hand.
Previously, a newspaper article may have sparked an editorial comment or two or several, from passionate readers. Opinions would be filtered before being published, subject to editorial scrutiny and may or may not see the light of day in print. Today, individuals can weigh in and comment on the news on-line, anonymously, in real time, with very few restrictions.
All to say, in coming to a decision in this case I have factored in the impact of indefinitely memorializing the victim's name and mental health information on the internet to his dignity, privacy and well-being. The ease with which anyone can search the internet for information about an individual, or this incident and learn the victim’s diagnosis (when one would not otherwise be entitled to this private medical information) weighs in favour of granting the order. [Paras 49-52]